How Albanophobia Develops Through Religious Division in North Macedonia

From "Islamic Terrorism" to "Albanian Orthodoxy": The Struggle for Albanian Identity in North Macedonia

In North Macedonia, the conflict over Albanian identity does not take place only in politics. It also operates through the language of security, the definition of extremism, religious narratives, historical memory, and the way in which the relationship between nationality and faith is defined.

On the one hand stands the Muslim Albanian, who, in security discourse, risks being reduced to the category of "Islamist," "radical," or "jihadist." On the other hand stands the Orthodox Albanian, whose identity challenges another nationalist equation: one that equates Orthodoxy with Slavic, Serbian, or Macedonian belonging.

These are two different mechanisms, but they ultimately lead to the same result: defining the Albanian through religion rather than through their national identity.

"Islamic Terrorism" and the Case of Skopje

On April 30, 2026, the National Security Agency, in cooperation with the Public Prosecutor's Office for Prosecution of Organized Crime and Corruption and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, carried out an operation in Skopje. According to the NSA, the operation followed the identification of individuals and a logistical network that, according to the agency's operational data, was linked to a radical group inspired by the global Islamic State network.[1]

The authorities linked the operation to an attempt to burn a property belonging to the Jewish Community in Skopje and to violent activities undertaken following an ISIS call at the beginning of April.[1]

On June 17, 2026, the Prosecutor's Office announced another case. Five people from Skopje, aged between 22 and 34, were placed under investigation for the criminal offense of "terrorist organization." According to the Prosecutor's Office, the group had been formed online at the end of 2024 and, during 2025–2026, had distributed materials promoting the ideology of ISIS and other terrorist organizations ideologically linked to it.[2]

In this case, the institutions have been clear: these are concrete investigations, concrete individuals, concrete materials, and concrete criminal offenses.

But this is precisely where the broader problem of public discourse begins.

An Albanian individual suspected of terrorism does not represent Albanians. A group propagating ISIS does not represent Islam. And the fight against terrorism cannot be transformed into a fight against an ethnic identity.

This is the dividing line that security institutions must preserve, while journalism must scrutinize it.

Because when a religious category and an ethnic category begin to be used as synonyms, individual terrorism is transformed into collective stigmatization.

The Albanian Does Not Begin and End with Religion

The history of Albanians in North Macedonia makes any definition of Albanian identity through a single religion impossible.

Albanians of this territory have been and are Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic.

One of the strongest pieces of evidence can be found in Upper Reka.

The Orthodox Albanian communities of Reka have been documented in historical literature and public testimony. Branko Manojllovski has openly articulated his identity as Albanian and Orthodox, speaking about a history in which Muslim and Orthodox Albanians lived in the same space.[3]

This is not merely a matter of individual memory.

The official register of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups of North Macedonia includes the Religious Community of Orthodox Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia.[4]

Therefore, the Orthodox Albanian is not a theoretical construct.

It is an identity publicly declared and recognized in the state register of religious communities.

Josif Bageri and Reka That Was Not Divided by Religion

Josif Bageri also occupies a place in the history of this region.

Born in Nistrovo in Upper Reka, Bageri was an activist of the Albanian National Renaissance and part of the efforts for the development of Albanian education and culture.[5]

His importance for this analysis lies precisely in the fact that the history of Reka cannot be reduced to the division of Albanians according to religious affiliation.

The Albanian Renaissance treated language and national consciousness as elements capable of uniting Albanians beyond religious differences.

This makes Reka a historical counterargument to any ideology seeking to construct the equation:

Muslim = Albanian; Orthodox = Slavic.

This equation does not correspond to the history of the Albanians of the Balkans.

Constantine and Christianity Before Nationalism

Another element that must be placed in perspective is the history of early Christianity.

Constantine the Great is associated with Naissus, the ancient city now known as Niš. He was one of the fundamental figures in the history of fourth-century Christianity and convened the Council of Nicaea in 325.[6]

But Constantine cannot be treated as the "founder of the Orthodox Church" in the modern institutional sense. The concepts of national churches and the Catholic–Orthodox division belong to much later periods.

This distinction is fundamental.

Fourth-century Christianity was not the national property of Serbs, Macedonians, or Albanians.

Balkan nationalism is a much later phenomenon.

Therefore, when a universal religious tradition begins to be defined as the exclusive property of a nation, we have moved from faith to the nationalization of religion.

The Serbian Church, the Macedonian Church, and the Conflict over Identity

The history of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church demonstrates that the church question in the Balkans has long had a national and political dimension.

The conflict over the status of the Macedonian Church was not merely a canonical dispute. It developed in a space where religion, language, territory, and national identity were intertwined.

The Serbian Orthodox Church itself, in its statement of May 16, 2022, recalled that the interruption of canonical communion had followed the unilateral declaration of autocephaly by the Macedonian Church in 1967.[7]

But history took an important turn in 2022.

The SOC restored liturgical and canonical communion with the Macedonian Church and subsequently recognized its autocephaly.[7][8]

This fact should not be overlooked.

It shows that the institutional conflict between the SOC and the MOC cannot today be used as evidence that the SOC continues to exercise institutional control over the Macedonian Church.

But it does not erase the history of the nationalization of religious identities in the region.

Nor does it close the other question: what happens to the Orthodox Albanian within spaces where Orthodoxy has historically been linked to Serbian or Macedonian national projects?

The Nationalization of Religion and the Problem of the Orthodox Albanian

The nationalization of religion operates through a simple mechanism: religion is used as a marker of nationality.

If Orthodoxy is defined as exclusively Serbian or Macedonian, then the Orthodox Albanian becomes an uncomfortable exception to this scheme.

But the history of Reka overturns this exception.

The Orthodox Albanian exists.

He has existed historically.

He has publicly declared his identity.

And an Orthodox Albanian community appears in the state register.

Thus, the problem does not lie with the Orthodox Albanian.

The problem appears only when someone seeks to tell him which identity he should choose.

If an Albanian is told that, because he is Orthodox, he must be Serbian or Macedonian, then religion is being used as a mechanism for changing or denying national identity.

This is precisely the form of division that must be examined.

From Religious Division to Albanophobia

Albanophobia does not necessarily appear only through direct statements against Albanians.

It can also appear through the way in which the Albanian is constructed in discourse.

The Muslim Albanian may be reduced to an "Islamist."

The Orthodox Albanian may be reduced to a "Macedonian" or "Serb."

In both cases, Albanian identity is weakened.

In the first case, the Albanian is presented as a security risk.

In the second case, the Albanian disappears as a national subject.

This is the core thesis of this article:

Religious division is not simply a division between two religious communities; it can be used to fragment Albanian identity itself into categories that can be controlled, stigmatized, or appropriated by other national narratives.

The Russian and Serbian Dimension of Information Warfare

At this point, the dimension of hybrid warfare enters the discussion.

The Institute of Communication Studies in Skopje has documented that North Macedonia is part of an environment in which foreign information manipulation and interference operations, known as FIMI, exploit social vulnerabilities and existing conflicts in order to influence public perceptions.[9]

In its specific study on Russian FIMI in North Macedonia, the institute emphasizes that the Western Balkans constitute an important terrain for Russian influence operations and that bilateral tensions and internal conflicts can be used to amplify influence narratives.[9]

This is important for the analysis of religious division.

An influence operation does not need to create a conflict from scratch.

It is enough to find an existing dividing line and deepen it.

In North Macedonia, one of the most sensitive dividing lines is the one connecting ethnicity, religion, and national identity.

Niš as Part of the Russian-Serbian Mosaic

In this context, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš cannot be left out of an analysis of Russian-Serbian influence in the Balkans.

The Center is officially presented as a Russian-Serbian humanitarian structure focused on responding to disasters and emergencies.[10]

Nevertheless, its role has for years been the subject of political and security debate.

For this reason, Niš should not be viewed as evidence of an "operational center" controlling events in Skopje, but as one of the institutional nodes of Russian-Serbian relations around which a broader debate over influence and security has developed.

This is consistent with broader analyses of FIMI and Russian influence in the Balkans.

But one thing must be stated clearly: none of these sources proves that the Niš Center directed the counterterrorism operations in Skopje.

Serious journalism does not need such an unproven connection.

It is enough to document the mechanism of influence and then follow the traces.

The Struggle for Albanian Identity Also Takes Place Within Orthodoxy

This is the point at which the issue takes on its deepest dimension.

For many decades, Albanian identity in the Balkans has been interpreted through religion. The Albanian has been imagined as Muslim; the Albanian Catholic has been treated as an exception; while the Orthodox Albanian has often been made even more invisible.

But this history does not correspond to reality.

Upper Reka is evidence.

Josif Bageri is evidence.

Branko Manojllovski is evidence.

The state register of religious communities is evidence.

The history of Albanians of different faiths is evidence.

This is why the Orthodox Albanian has significance far greater than a local religious debate.

He overturns the idea that religion determines the nation.

And precisely for this reason, his identity becomes a political and cultural battleground.

Conclusion

Modern Albanophobia should not be sought only in the direct vocabulary used against Albanians.

It can also appear through the way Albanians are classified.

The Muslim Albanian is reduced to a potential security risk.

The Orthodox Albanian is separated from Albanian identity and pushed toward another national identity.

In both cases, Albanian identity loses its complexity.

Therefore, the struggle over Albanian identity in North Macedonia is simultaneously a struggle against two reductions: against reducing the Albanian to a Muslim and against reducing the Orthodox person to a Serb or Macedonian.

These two mechanisms are not the same, but they can produce the same political effect: the division of Albanians along religious lines.

In this sense, Reka is not merely a chapter of local history. It is a counterargument to every project that links nationhood with religion.

Josif Bageri is not merely a figure of the Renaissance. He is evidence that Albanian identity and Orthodoxy have not been incompatible identities.

And the Orthodox Albanian of today is not a paradox.

It is a continuation of a reality that existed long before modern Balkan nationalisms turned religion into a national boundary.

If North Macedonia wishes to be a civic and multiethnic state, then the principle should be simple:

Religion does not determine the nation, nor should the nation determine religion.

Any attempt to do the opposite creates fertile ground for division.

And precisely there, in the space between religion, nationalism, security, and identity, the mechanism through which Albanophobia can take new forms must be sought.

Footnotes

[1] National Security Agency of the Republic of North Macedonia, statement on the April 30, 2026 counterterrorism operation and the identification of a radical group ideologically linked to the global ISIS network.

[2] Public Prosecutor's Office for Prosecution of Organized Crime and Corruption, "Five Persons Under Investigation for Terrorist Organization," June 17, 2026.

[3] For Orthodox Albanians of Reka and the public statements of Branko Manojllovski, see academic literature and his public interviews concerning Albanian and Orthodox identity.

[4] Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups of the Republic of North Macedonia, official register of religious communities.

[5] Historical literature on Josif Bageri and his activities in the Albanian National Renaissance; Bageri was from Nistrovo in Upper Reka and worked for Albanian education and culture.

[6] Historical and academic sources on Constantine the Great, Naissus, and the Council of Nicaea of 325.

[7] Serbian Orthodox Church, statement of the Holy Synod/Holy Assembly of May 16, 2022, on the restoration of canonical and liturgical communion with the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

[8] Serbian Orthodox Church, official documentation concerning the recognition of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in 2022.

[9] Institute of Communication Studies, Russian FIMI in North Macedonia: Exploiting Vulnerabilities Through Bilateral Disputes, November 13, 2025.

[10] Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center, official documents concerning the establishment and function of the Center in Niš.

Prishtina, 28.09.2026