The Ibar and Ujman – When Water Becomes a Matter of Security and International Law

Nga Isuf B. Bajrami

There are political statements that may pass as part of the usual noise of the Balkans. There are others that require us to take them seriously, not because of the emotions they provoke, but because of the consequences they may produce if words are transformed into actions.

The statement by the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vu?i?, that Serbia has called in experts and engineers to examine the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River belongs to this category.¹

We do not need to dramatize the statement in order to understand its significance. It is enough to take it seriously as it was made.

Because the Ibar is not simply a river.

It is part of a water system that connects territories and interests of several states. The Ibar flows through Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo while its source lies in Montenegro, on the northern side of Mount Hajla, southwest of Rožaje.²

This geographical detail is of particular importance.

The source of the Ibar is not in Serbia.

Its course subsequently passes through Serbia and Kosovo, while the water system connected to Gazivoda/Ujman has direct importance for Kosovo's water and economic security. The World Bank has addressed the Ibar basin and the Gazivoda/Ujman system in the context of transboundary water management and has identified the importance of this system for water supply, energy and other vital functions in Kosovo.³

Therefore, any project aimed at significantly altering the flow of the Ibar cannot be viewed merely as a technical project within the territory of a single state.

It has the potential to become a transboundary issue.

And if such an intervention were to produce significant consequences for another state, it would enter the field of international water law and the protection of the transboundary environment.

ONE RIVER, THREE STATE SPACES

This is one of the most important aspects of the issue.

Water that connects several states cannot be treated as though it were merely an internal matter of one of them.

The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes defines "transboundary waters" as surface or ground waters which mark, cross or are located on boundaries between two or more States. The Convention also addresses the river basin in a broader sense than merely the physical riverbed.?

This means that the transboundary dimension of water does not arise only when water crosses a state border.

It exists because of the hydrological connection and the consequences that actions in one part of the system may produce in other parts.

In the case of the Ibar, this takes on particular significance precisely because its system extends across Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia.² ³

For this reason, a significant intervention in the flow of the Ibar should not be viewed solely as a Kosovo–Serbia issue.

It may have a broader regional and international dimension.

If an intervention were to significantly affect the flow, quantity or use of water within the territory of another state, the issue would no longer be merely bilateral.

It would become a matter concerning a transboundary watercourse.

INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT BEGIN AFTER THE DAMAGE

This is perhaps the most important distinction to make.

We are not saying that Vu?i?'s statement, in itself, already constitutes a violation of international law.

Such a conclusion would be legally premature, because we do not have before us a detailed technical project, its parameters, location, technical method or measurable impact.

But international law gives us precisely the instruments with which such a project can be assessed if it becomes concrete.

The UNECE Convention is built around three pillars: the obligation to prevent, control and reduce significant transboundary impact; the equitable and reasonable use of transboundary waters; and cooperation between States sharing transboundary waters.?

Most importantly for the present case, UNECE expressly clarifies that the Convention addresses not only water quality but also water quantity. A change in water quantity may cause transboundary impact and, in such circumstances, the relevant principles concerning prevention, equitable use and cooperation become applicable.?

Indeed, in its official questions and answers, UNECE directly addresses situations in which an upstream activity may interrupt or reduce downstream flow. In such circumstances, potentially relevant provisions include the obligation to prevent transboundary impact, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, cooperation and consultations. UNECE emphasizes that the specific obligations depend on the circumstances of each case.?

This is precisely why a potential project to divert the Ibar cannot be viewed merely as an engineering issue.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE AND REASONABLE UTILIZATION

Modern international water law does not grant a state the right to use an international watercourse as though the interests of other states did not exist.

The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses provides for the equitable and reasonable utilization and participation of watercourse States and establishes an obligation to take appropriate measures not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States.?

This approach has also been reflected in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.

In the Silala case, the Court confirmed that, under customary international law, each riparian State has a right to an equitable and reasonable share of the uses of the resources of an international watercourse and, at the same time, an obligation not to exceed that right by depriving other States of their right to reasonable use. The Court also emphasized the obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to the other State.?

This does not mean that every alteration of the flow of a river is automatically unlawful.

It means something more important: such a project must be assessed in relation to the rights and interests of other riparian States.

PREVENTION, NOTIFICATION AND CONSULTATION

If a concrete project could have significant transboundary impact, the dimension of international environmental law also becomes relevant.

The Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context establishes procedures for situations in which a proposed activity may cause significant adverse transboundary impact. It provides, among other things, for notification of a potentially affected State, exchange of information, environmental impact assessment documentation and consultations.¹?

The International Court of Justice, in the Silala case, has likewise linked the obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm with procedural obligations of cooperation, notification and consultation where a planned activity presents a risk of such harm.?

Therefore, if a political idea were to become a concrete technical project, the question would not simply be:

"What does Serbia intend to do?"

The question would be:

"What transboundary consequences could the project have, and what international obligations arise before it is carried out?"

This is the difference between political reaction and state prevention.

UJMAN IS STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE

For Kosovo, the issue of Ujman is not symbolic.

The World Bank has identified the management of Gazivoda/Ujman and the Ibar-Lepenc canal as part of Kosovo's important water-security challenges and has noted that the canal system serves critical functions in the economic heart of the country.³

Therefore, an intervention that significantly reduced the system's water supply could have multiple consequences.

It could affect water security.

It could affect energy.

It could affect industry.

It could affect agriculture and other vital services.

And in a politically tense situation, it could also become a security issue.

This is why we view Ujman as strategic infrastructure that deserves institutional protection, continuous expert assessment and serious planning for possible scenarios.

SECURITY AND KFOR

Here we must be particularly precise.

The Military Technical Agreement of 9 June 1999 established the Ground Safety Zone, a five-kilometre zone beyond the border of Kosovo, within the territory of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and imposed restrictions on the presence of Yugoslav and Serbian forces in that zone.¹¹

But it would not be accurate today to read this provision as though the 1999 regime had remained unchanged.

In May 2001, NATO announced that the North Atlantic Council had authorized the KFOR Commander to permit the controlled return of Yugoslav and Serbian forces into Sector B of the Ground Safety Zone, as the final phase of a gradual and conditional process. NATO also stated that KFOR would monitor implementation.¹²

Therefore, the legally accurate formulation is this:

KFOR has an international security mandate and operates within the framework of Security Council Resolution 1244 and the relevant agreements, but it cannot automatically be said that there is today an unchanged rule granting KFOR the authority to order all Serbian military and security structures to withdraw five kilometres from the border.

Security Council Resolution 1244 established the international framework for the civilian and security presence in Kosovo and authorized the international security presence to create a secure environment for all people in Kosovo.¹³

This is the basis on which we view KFOR: as an international security and preventive mechanism, not as an instrument of any political party.

If a new development were to create a serious security risk, the matter would have to be assessed in accordance with KFOR's current mandate, operational rules and the international security framework.

MONTENEGRO – SERBIA – KOSOVO: AN ISSUE THAT CANNOT REMAIN MERELY BILATERAL

There is another dimension that deserves attention.

The geography of the Ibar connects the water system with the territories of Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia.² ³

This does not mean that every problem concerning the Ibar automatically becomes a conflict between three states.

That would be equally inaccurate.

But it would be a serious mistake for an intervention with potentially transboundary consequences to be considered solely as a Kosovo–Serbia issue.

If a project in one part of the water system were to affect the interests of a third state, that state would have grounds to request information, consultation and impact assessment in accordance with the legal instruments applicable to the particular circumstances.

This is why Montenegro's dimension must not be forgotten.

And this is precisely where geography can become an instrument of preventive diplomacy.

KOSOVO'S SERB CITIZENS ARE NOT THE PROBLEM

We have no reason to turn an issue of water and state security into a conflict with a community.

On the contrary, respecting the rights of all citizens strengthens Kosovo's argument against any form of external interference.

THE STRONGEST RESPONSE IS INSTITUTIONAL

We do not see the response to a possible policy by Belgrade as a competition over who can retaliate more forcefully.

If Serbia undertakes an action affecting Kosovo's vital interests, the strongest response is not collective punishment, and even less an attack on Kosovo's Serb citizens.

The strongest response is state-based.

Legal.

Diplomatic.

Economic, where necessary and where permitted by the applicable framework.

And coordinated with international partners.

Reciprocity should not be ethnic.

It should be institutional.

If international rules are violated, the response proceeds through legal and diplomatic mechanisms.

If Kosovo's economic interests are affected, economic instruments are used in accordance with the law.

If security is threatened, security mechanisms are activated according to their mandates.

That is far more powerful than retaliation.

EUROPE AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERS

Serbia has deep economic ties with the European Union and with Western economies. This creates room for diplomacy and influence.

But we do not need our partners to build their policy around the idea of "punishing Serbia."

Our argument is stronger:

Euro-Atlantic partners have a direct interest in the stability of the Western Balkans.

Therefore, any project that could create new cross-border tensions, water insecurity or a security crisis should also be viewed in terms of regional stability.

We do not expect the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom or Türkiye to be "against Serbia."

We expect them to be against destabilization.

That is an essential distinction.

KOSOVO AND ALBANIA

Kosovo and Albania have natural opportunities for diplomatic, technical and legal coordination.

Not to create a conflict with another people.

Not to fuel escalation.

But to jointly present the facts when issues arise that concern Kosovo's security, stability and strategic interests.

Kosovo has its own institutions.

Albania has its own state, its foreign policy and its membership in NATO.

These two realities do not need to merge into one.

But they can cooperate wherever their interests coincide.

In the case of the Ibar and Ujman, coordinated expertise, diplomacy and legal argument would be more valuable than any emotional declaration.

WE DO NOT NEED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LAW AND POWER

The Balkans have often been viewed through an old dilemma: either you have power, or you have the law.

We believe this is a false dilemma.

A small state cannot compete in every dimension with a larger state.

But a state can become much stronger when it connects law with diplomacy, diplomacy with alliances, and alliances with a prudent policy.

That is what makes the issue of Ujman important.

It gives us the opportunity to transform a potentially conflictual problem into an issue of international rules.

And in an international system built on rules, that is strength.

LET US NOT ALLOW UJMAN TO BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF FEAR

We do not need to know today whether Vu?i?'s statement will become a project.

It is enough to know that he has publicly raised the possibility and stated that experts have been engaged to examine it.¹

This gives us an opportunity to think ahead.

To study.

To document.

To consult experts.

To speak with partners.

To prepare scenarios.

And above all, not to allow fear to become policy.

A state is measured not only by how it responds when it is attacked.

It is also measured by its ability to prevent the attack.

In this sense, Ujman can be more than a water issue.

It can be a test of Kosovo's maturity as a state.

A test of whether we can replace delayed reaction with prevention.

Rhetoric with documentation.

Emotion with expertise.

And fear with security.

THE STRONGEST RESPONSE IS THE STATE

We do not see Kosovo's future as a competition over who can issue the strongest threat.

We see it as an effort to make the state sufficiently resilient that threats do not change its direction.

If Belgrade turns the idea of changing the course of the Ibar into a concrete project, that project will face the law, expertise, diplomacy and international mechanisms.

If it remains merely a political statement, prudent diplomacy can keep it where it belongs: at the level of a statement.

In either case, Kosovo gains if it remains calm, prepared and connected to its partners.

Because a state is not protected only when someone attacks it.

A state is protected by building, every day, the institutions that make destabilization more difficult.

And perhaps this is the most important message emerging from the debate over the Ibar and Ujman:

We do not need to become louder.

We need to become more prepared.

More united around the state interest.

More capable of speaking the language of law.

More credible to our partners.

And more determined to protect Kosovo without losing what we seek to protect: a democratic, secure and respected state.

Water is life.

But in this case, water is also a test of peace.

And peace, like the state, is not preserved by waiting.

It is preserved by being prepared.

FOOTNOTES:

KoSSev, "Vu?i? Says Serbia Is Considering Diverting the Ibar River, Raising Questions Over Gazivode/Ujman", 9 August 2026.

The source documents Serbian President Aleksandar Vu?i?'s public statement that Serbia had called in experts, engineers and people from the construction sector to examine the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar. The report also clarifies that Vu?i? did not specify the location where the intervention would take place, the technical method of diversion, or the existence of an approved government project. Therefore, in the article the statement is presented as a political declaration and signal, rather than as evidence that an approved technical project already exists.

Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, Hrvatska enciklopedija, entry "Ibar", online edition.

The Croatian encyclopedia describes the Ibar as a river in Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia, with a length of approximately 272 km and a drainage basin of approximately 8,059 km². It places the source on the northern side of Mount Hajla, in Montenegro, approximately ten kilometres southwest of Rožaje. This source is used in the article for the geographical fact that the source of the Ibar is located in Montenegro, not Serbia.

World Bank Group, Water Security Outlook for Kosovo, Washington, D.C., June 2018.

The World Bank report addresses Kosovo's water-security situation and, in particular, the management of Gazivoda/Ujman and the Ibar-Lepenc canal. The document places the management of Gazivoda/Pridvorica and the Ibar-Lepenc system within the broader challenges of water security and the unresolved Kosovo–Serbia relationship. It emphasizes that the Ibar-Lepenc canal serves multiple critical functions in the central economic area of Kosovo.

UNECE, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992; UNECE, "FAQs, Part 4 – Scope".

UNECE explains that the Convention applies to transboundary waters and that the concept is not limited to an isolated body of water, but also relates to the wider drainage basin. Transboundary waters include surface or ground waters that mark, cross or are located on boundaries between two or more States. This is the basis for treating the Ibar as an issue with a transboundary dimension.

UNECE, Water Convention – FAQs, Part 5: Principles and Obligations.

UNECE identifies three central pillars of the Convention: the obligation to prevent, control and reduce significant transboundary impact; the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization; and the principle of cooperation. For riparian States, these include, among other things, agreements or arrangements, joint bodies, consultations, exchange of information, warning systems and mutual assistance.

UNECE, "FAQs, Part 4", question 4.7 – Does the Water Convention regulate water quantity issues?

UNECE expressly states that the Convention covers transboundary impacts relating both to water quality and water quantity. Changes in quantity may cause transboundary impact, including consequences for health and security. UNECE emphasizes that equitable and reasonable utilization is one of the central principles for addressing questions of water quantity.

UNECE, "FAQs, Part 5", question 5.6 – Does the Water Convention apply when a planned activity upstream will disrupt or reduce the flow downstream?

This is one of the most directly relevant references for the argument of the article. UNECE explains that where an upstream activity may interrupt or reduce downstream flow, provisions concerning transboundary impact, prevention, control and reduction, equitable and reasonable utilization, cooperation and consultations may become relevant. UNECE emphasizes that the precise obligations depend on the specific circumstances of the case.

United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 21 May 1997, Articles 5–7.

Article 5 establishes the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and participation in an international watercourse. Article 6 identifies the factors relevant to determining such utilization, while Article 7 provides for the obligation to take appropriate measures not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States. In the present article, these provisions are used as part of the international legal framework, without claiming that every provision of the Convention automatically applies as a treaty to every State concerned.

International Court of Justice, Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v. Bolivia), Judgment, 1 December 2022, in particular paragraphs 64–65 and 96–102.

The ICJ treated the international watercourse as a shared resource over which riparian States have reciprocal rights and obligations. In paragraph 97, the Court stated that, under customary international law, each riparian State has a fundamental right to an equitable and reasonable share in the uses of the resources of an international watercourse, but also an obligation not to exceed that right by depriving other States of their right to reasonable use. The Court connects this with the obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent significant harm.

UNECE, Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), Espoo, 25 February 1991, Articles 2–5.

The Espoo Convention establishes a framework for environmental impact assessment where proposed activities may cause significant adverse transboundary impacts. Depending on the circumstances and the legal status of the States concerned, relevant mechanisms may include notification, documentation, exchange of information and consultations. This reference is used to support the need for prior assessment and consultation, not to claim automatically that every possible project concerning the Ibar is subject to a particular procedure without examining the legal status of the parties involved.

Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, Kumanovo, 9 June 1999.

The Military Technical Agreement established the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) as a five-kilometre zone beyond the border of Kosovo within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and imposed restrictions on the presence of Yugoslav and Serbian forces within that zone. This document is the historical basis for the reference to "five kilometres". However, it should not be read in isolation from the subsequent changes to the GSZ regime.

NATO, "Return of Yugoslav Security Forces to Sector B of the Ground Safety Zone", Press Release (2001)066, 14 May 2001.

On 14 May 2001, NATO announced that the North Atlantic Council had authorized the KFOR Commander to permit the controlled return of Yugoslav and Serbian forces to Sector B of the Ground Safety Zone, describing this as the final stage of a gradual and conditional process. NATO stated that KFOR would monitor implementation and that the Council would remain engaged on the issue. This is why the article does not make the legally inaccurate claim that the original five-kilometre rule continues today in exactly the same form.

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.

Resolution 1244 established the international framework for the civilian and security presence in Kosovo and authorized the international security presence with the objective, among other things, of establishing a secure environment for all people in Kosovo. In the article, it is used as the basis for describing the international character of KFOR's mandate, rather than attributing to KFOR powers that do not arise from the resolution, subsequent documents or the operational framework.

International Court of Justice, Silala, Judgment, 1 December 2022 – obligation of cooperation, notification and consultation.

The ICJ connects the substantive principle of preventing significant transboundary harm with procedural obligations of cooperation, notification and consultation where a planned activity may present such a risk. This authority is particularly useful in avoiding an approach that treats international law merely as a mechanism activated after damage has already occurred.

World Bank Group, Water Security Outlook for Kosovo, 2018.

The report describes Kosovo as a country facing serious water-security challenges and connects the issue with water-resource management, energy, economic development and transboundary relations. The sections concerning Gazivoda/Ujman and the Ibar-Lepenc canal are particularly important to the argument that Ujman is not merely a local reservoir, but part of infrastructure serving multiple critical functions.

UNECE, Water Convention – Frequently Asked Questions, Part 5.

UNECE also clarifies that where a Party shares transboundary waters with a State that is not a Party to the Convention, the obligations arising directly from the Convention have their limitations; nevertheless, customary international law remains relevant. This is an important legal qualification for any serious analysis of the status of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and avoids broad claims about the automatic application of a treaty.

International Court of Justice, Silala, paragraphs 96–102.

The Court emphasizes that an international watercourse is a shared resource and that the rights of riparian States must be reconciled. Within this framework, a State does not lose sovereignty over its own territory, but the exercise of territorial rights and the development of infrastructure must respect international obligations relating to shared resources and transboundary harm. This principle is particularly relevant to any future infrastructure project capable of affecting the flow of the Ibar.

Methodological conclusion concerning the international character of the Ibar issue.

The fact that the Ibar originates in Montenegro and continues through Kosovo and Serbia does not mean that every dispute concerning it automatically becomes an "international conflict" between three States. The legally more precise formulation is that we are dealing with a transboundary water system involving interconnected interests of several States. If a concrete project were to produce significant transboundary impacts, the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, prevention of harm, cooperation, information exchange, consultation and, depending on the legal instruments applicable in the circumstances, transboundary environmental impact assessment could become relevant. This is a legally stronger formulation than categorically declaring that the issue is automatically an "international conflict".

The Land of Leka, 10.08.2026