The Mediterranean and the Balkans in the Era of Expanded Warfare: Ukraine and the Reconfiguration of Maritime Corridors

By Isuf B. Bajrami

Transformation of Maritime Security and Geopolitical Rivalries in the Euro-Mediterranean Space after 2022

Preface

This paper examines the transformation of security in the Mediterranean and the Balkans in the context of the war in Ukraine and recent changes in the international security architecture. The conflict in Ukraine has not only produced military consequences within the Black Sea region, but has also directly affected the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Balkans, increasing the strategic sensitivity of maritime corridors, energy infrastructure, and NATO's peripheral zones.

Within this framework, the use of unmanned technologies, the expansion of hybrid forms of conflict, and the intensification of geopolitical rivalries have created a more complex and fragmented security environment. Maritime incidents, regional tensions, and competition over the control of strategic corridors can no longer be understood as isolated developments, but rather as part of a broader system of interaction among state actors, paramilitary structures, and mechanisms of information warfare.

The paper analyzes:

* the transformation of modern naval warfare after 2022,

* the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic,

* the impact of the Russian presence in Syria and Libya,

* the role of paramilitary structures and unmanned technologies,

* as well as the effect of hybrid narratives on regional security perceptions.

Special attention is also devoted to the historical dimension of maritime security in the region, including the legal and political precedents associated with the Corfu Channel Incident, as a case that continues to hold significance in debates concerning maritime control, sovereignty, and the international interpretation of incidents in maritime spaces.

The purpose of this paper is not to produce definitive attributions regarding specific incidents or to support unverified political narratives, but rather to analyze how the war in Ukraine and the transformation of the Euro-Mediterranean strategic environment have increased insecurity in maritime corridors and strengthened the interconnection between the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and other theaters of international conflict.

In this sense, the Mediterranean and the Balkans no longer appear as peripheral regions of the international order, but rather as central nodes of geopolitical competition, where the following intersect:

* energy security,

* military rivalries,

* emerging technologies,

* and modern forms of hybrid warfare.

Introduction

Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has significantly transformed the architecture of European and Euro-Mediterranean security. The conflict, initially confined to the Black Sea region, has indirectly expanded toward the Mediterranean and the Balkans through changes in the military balance, the use of new military technologies, and increasing insecurity in strategic maritime corridors.[1]

This process has produced three major developments:

* the militarization of maritime spaces,

* the growing role of unmanned systems,

* and the fragmentation of traditional security balances in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

I. Ukraine and the Transformation of Modern Naval Warfare

The war in Ukraine has introduced a significant change in the conduct of naval operations through the extensive use of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the Black Sea.[2]

According to analyses by NATO and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), these systems have:

* altered the relationship between traditional fleets and asymmetric capabilities,

* increased the risks of long-range operations,

* and contributed to the global spread of new naval warfare doctrines.[3]

The use of unmanned systems has produced a major operational transformation in which actors with more limited capabilities are able to challenge traditional naval structures through asymmetric methods. This has created a new model of naval warfare in which technological flexibility and operational deniability acquire particular importance.

II. The Eastern Mediterranean as a Space of Overlapping Crises

The Eastern Mediterranean today represents a space where several security dynamics intersect:

* the Greece–Turkey rivalry,

* tensions in the Middle East,

* and competition over energy and maritime corridors.[4]

In this environment, every maritime incident has the potential to assume regional dimensions due to the high level of strategic sensitivity and the lack of operational transparency.

The Eastern Mediterranean no longer functions solely as a commercial and energy corridor, but as a space where the following overlap:

* NATO interests,

* regional rivalries,

* and global competition for power projection.

III. The Drone Incident in the Mediterranean and the Dynamics of Interpretatio

In 2026, international and regional media reported the discovery of an unmanned surface vessel (USV) in waters near western Greece, in the Ionian area.[5]

Greek authorities stated that the object was:

* military in nature,

* equipped with explosives,

* and under investigation regarding its origin and operational route.[6]

Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis described the incident as "extremely serious" and emphasized the need to avoid further militarization of the Mediterranean.[7]

Several regional media reports mentioned hypotheses regarding the possible origin of the vessel, including different areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic, although these remain unconfirmed by official sources or independent technical verification.[8]

From the perspective of security analysis, the importance of this incident lies more in the way it is interpreted than in immediate attribution, reflecting the characteristics of hybrid warfare and informational uncertainty.

The incident demonstrates that unmanned technologies have created an environment in which:

* operational identification becomes more difficult,

* political deniability increases,

* and maritime spaces acquire renewed strategic importance.

IV. The Balkans as a Strategically Sensitive Space

The Western Balkans remain an area where NATO influence intersects with actors of differing geopolitical orientations.

The region is characterized by:

* partial Euro-Atlantic integration,

* persistent political and identity tensions,

* and exposure to influence through energy, information, and parallel diplomacy.[9]

Within this framework, the Balkans do not represent merely Europe's periphery, but a strategic transition zone between:

* the Adriatic,

* the Mediterranean,

* and eastern Eurasian corridors.

V. Maritime Corridors and Strategic Reconfiguration

One of the most significant structural changes is the growing role of maritime corridors:

* Black Sea ? Eastern Mediterranean

* Mediterranean ? Atlantic

* Adriatic ? European energy networks

Within this framework, Greece and Turkey serve as key nodes in controlling maritime and energy circulation within the region.[10]

The intensification of competition over maritime corridors has produced:

* the militarization of strategic ports,

* the expansion of maritime surveillance,

* and increased sensitivity to hybrid incidents.

VI. Hybrid Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Dimension of Narratives

The current security environment in the Mediterranean is characterized by elements of hybrid warfare, in which:

* technical incidents are interpreted as strategic events,

* partial information generates competing narratives,

* and media and political actors influence perceptions of risk.[11]

Within this context, various regional narratives concerning the influence of external actors in the Balkans and the Mediterranean have also emerged. However, these narratives are often not supported by verified operational evidence and should therefore be treated as part of the field of strategic perception rather than necessarily as confirmed fact.

This is characteristic of modern hybrid environments, where:

* informational uncertainty,

* indirect operations,

* and the use of informal actors

create a gray zone between classical conflict and strategic competition.

VII. Historical Memory: The Corfu Channel Incident

The Corfu Channel Incident (1946) remains a foundational precedent in international maritime law. In 1949, the International Court of Justice established Albania's responsibility for failing to warn of dangers within its territorial waters.[12]

This case established important standards regarding:

* state responsibility in maritime spaces,

* and the importance of the safety of international navigation.

From an analytical perspective, the case serves as a precedent for how maritime incidents may escalate into international crises through political and legal interpretation.

Beyond its legal interpretation, the incident remains part of the historical debate surrounding post-Second World War rivalries in the Adriatic and the Balkans, reflecting the strategic sensitivity of Albanian maritime spaces in relation to international rivalries.

VIII. Ukraine as a Catalyst for the Reconfiguration of Euro-Mediterranean Security

The war in Ukraine has functioned as a catalyst for a broader restructuring of security in Eurasia and the Mediterranean. It has:

* accelerated the militarization of maritime spaces,

* increased the use of unmanned systems,

* and strengthened the interconnection between different security theaters.

As a result, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans are increasingly being treated as components of an interconnected strategic system rather than isolated geographical zones.

This transformation has produced a situation in which:

* regional conflicts affect global corridors,

* military technologies spread more rapidly,

* and maritime security becomes a central component of international competition.

IX. Russian Presence in the Mediterranean, Libya, and Syria: Military Infrastructure, Mercenaries, and the Operational Dimension of Maritime Insecurity

One of the most significant developments in Euro-Mediterranean security after 2022 has been the transformation of the Russian presence in the Mediterranean and North Africa. The war in Ukraine and the relative weakening of Russia's position in the Black Sea have pushed Moscow to reconfigure its military and logistical presence in the southern Mediterranean spaces.[13]

Over the past decade, Russia had built a system of power projection in the Mediterranean based on:

* naval presence in Syria,

* military cooperation with actors in Libya,

* and the use of paramilitary structures such as the Wagner Group.[14]

1. Syria and the Strategic Importance of Tartus

The Naval Base of Tartus represented for years Russia's principal logistical hub in the Mediterranean. It enabled Moscow to maintain:

* long-term naval supply,

* operational maintenance,

* and a continuous military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.[15]

However, following developments in Syria and the gradual reduction of the Russian presence during 2024–2025, Tartus' operational capacity has weakened considerably. Maritime security analyses indicate that Russia no longer maintains its previous level of control and naval presence in the Mediterranean.[16]

According to OSINT assessments and naval analyses:

* Russian fleet activity has declined,

* the use of submarines in the Mediterranean has significantly decreased,

* and Russian vessels increasingly operate in dispersed formations with limited logistical support.[17]

2. Libya as a New Strategic Node

At the same time, Libya has become increasingly important within the Russian strategic architecture in the Mediterranean and Africa. Numerous international reports indicate that Russia has expanded its activities in eastern Libya through:

* Wagner mercenaries,

* Africa Corps structures,

* the transfer of military equipment,

* and the use of local airports and ports.[18]

According to European and American assessments:

* the Russian presence in Libya is not limited solely to the Libyan dimension,

* but is connected to control over central Mediterranean corridors,

* influence in North Africa,

* and the creation of an alternative foothold following the weakening of Russia's position in Syria.[19]

3. Wagner, "Africa Corps," and the Privatization of Military Projection

Following the weakening of the traditional Wagner structure, many Russian paramilitary operations in Africa were gradually integrated into structures directly connected to the Russian Ministry of Defense through the "Africa Corps."[20]

This model of utilizing paramilitary structures has enabled:

* operational flexibility,

* political deniability,

* and indirect presence in areas with weak state control.

In Libya, these structures have reportedly been present in:

* military airports,

* energy zones,

* and strategic logistical corridors.[21]

4. The Iranian Dimension and the Interconnection of Conflict Theaters

The war in Ukraine has also created a deeper interconnection between Russia and Iran, especially in the field of military technology and unmanned systems.[22]

Iran has been identified as one of the principal suppliers of drones used by Russia in Ukraine, while technological cooperation between the two countries has expanded into:

* drones,

* missile systems,

* and electronic warfare.[23]

This has contributed to the emergence of a broader security system in which:

* the Middle East,

* the Mediterranean,

* and the Black Sea

are increasingly treated as operationally interconnected theaters.

5. The Operational Possibility of Using Mediterranean Corridors for Unmanned Systems

Within this strategic context, maritime security analyses have increasingly begun to treat the Mediterranean as a potential operational space for unmanned systems.

This does not imply direct evidence regarding specific incidents, but reflects:

* the expansion in the use of naval drones,

* the presence of multiple military and paramilitary actors,

* and the difficulty of fully monitoring maritime corridors in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

In the case of the drone incident in Greek waters, regional media and unofficial analyses mentioned different scenarios concerning the possible origin of the vessel, including:

* areas of the Eastern Mediterranean,

* corridors near Libya,

* and Adriatic spaces.[24]

Nevertheless:

* Greek authorities did not publish a definitive operational attribution,

* and no independent public confirmation exists regarding the origin of the vessel.

This uncertainty is characteristic of the modern hybrid warfare environment, in which:

* unmanned technology,

* indirect operations,

* and information warfare

create an ambiguous space between technical incident and strategic crisis.

Conclusion

The reconfiguration of security in the Mediterranean and the Balkans is the result of the interaction between the war in Ukraine, regional tensions, and the technological transformation of modern warfare.

Maritime incidents, including those involving unmanned systems, no longer represent isolated events, but elements of a broader environment in which:

* the traditional boundaries of conflict have blurred,

* maritime corridors have become strategic spaces,

* and perceptions of security are as important as operational realities.

In this sense, the Mediterranean and the Balkans no longer represent peripheral zones of the international security system, but rather nodes where global crises intersect, where the war in Ukraine, energy rivalries, unmanned technologies, and geopolitical competition generate a new strategic environment with increasingly blurred boundaries between regional conflict and the global security architecture.

Footnotes:

[1] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022. The document identifies Russia as "the most significant and direct threat" to Euro-Atlantic security and emphasizes the strategic importance of maritime spaces and emerging technologies.

[2] Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, official statements and operational briefings on the use of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the Black Sea, 2023–2025; see also operational reports published by the Ukrainian Navy and the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR).

[3] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Maritime Security and Unmanned Systems Report 2024–2025, London: IISS, 2025. The report analyzes the transformation of naval warfare through autonomous systems and their impact on the traditional balance of naval power.

[4] International Crisis Group, Eastern Mediterranean Security Dynamics, Brussels: ICG Reports, 2024. The report addresses energy rivalries, Greece–Turkey tensions, and the gradual militarization of the Eastern Mediterranean.

[5] Reuters, reports concerning the unmanned maritime vessel incident in the waters of western Greece and developments in Mediterranean maritime security, 2026.

[6] Kathimerini and Ekathimerini, reports on the investigations conducted by Greek authorities regarding the unmanned surface vessel (USV), including statements from security structures and preliminary technical assessments, 2026.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, public statements by Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis regarding the incident and security in the Mediterranean, Athens, 2026.

[8] Top Channel and other regional Balkan media outlets, reports concerning hypotheses regarding the possible origin of the maritime vessel; these reports have not been confirmed by official authorities or independent technical investigations, 2026.

[9] European Commission, 2024–2025 Enlargement Package: Western Balkans, Brussels: European Commission, 2024–2025. The documents analyze political, security, and geopolitical challenges in the Western Balkans.

[10] European Commission, Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Framework, Brussels: European Union Energy Policy Documentation. Strategic framework regarding European energy corridors and critical infrastructure.

[11] BBC Monitoring and Reuters Special Reports, analyses on information warfare, "strategic ambiguity," and the influence of media in contemporary hybrid conflicts, 2024–2026.

[12] International Court of Justice (ICJ), Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of 9 April 1949, The Hague: ICJ Reports, 1949. Foundational judgment concerning state responsibility and the safety of navigation in territorial waters.

[13] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Madrid Summit Declaration, Brussels, 2022. The document describes the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic strategic environment following the war in Ukraine.

[14] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024–2025, London: Routledge/IISS, 2025. The report contains data regarding the Russian military presence in Syria, the Mediterranean, and North Africa.

[15] NATO Maritime Security Centre and Western maritime security analyses concerning the Russian naval base in Tartus and its logistical role in the Mediterranean, 2023–2025.

[16] Naval News, "After Loss of Tartus, Russia Now Has No Submarines in the Mediterranean," 2025. Analysis concerning the reduction of Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean following the weakening of its position in Syria.

[17] ItaMilRadar, OSINT reports on Russian fleet movements and maritime activity in the Mediterranean, 2025. The analyses are based on satellite monitoring and AIS tracking of military vessels.

[18] Military Africa, "Russia Shifts Focus to Libya Following Setbacks in Syria," 2025. Report concerning the expansion of Russian activity in eastern Libya and the use of paramilitary structures.

[19] Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), "Putin's Empire-Building Base Hunt Reaches Libya," Washington D.C., 2025. Analysis concerning Russian strategic interest in military bases and central Mediterranean corridors.

[20] The Washington Post, analyses and reviews regarding the transformation of the Wagner Group and the gradual integration of paramilitary structures into the "Africa Corps," 2025.

[21] International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), "Russia's Ghost Ships Haunt Libya," 2025. Investigation concerning logistical networks, maritime transport, and Russian activity along the Libyan coast.

[22] Reports by Western security institutions and strategic analyses concerning Iran–Russia military cooperation, 2024–2025; see also Atlantic Council and CSIS assessments regarding the transfer of military technologies.

[23] Reuters and Western intelligence assessments regarding the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia and their use in the war in Ukraine, 2023–2025.

[24] Reuters, Kathimerini, and regional reports concerning the maritime incident in Greek waters and hypotheses regarding the possible movement corridors of the unmanned vessel, 2026.

The Land of Leka, 13.05.2026