Dialogue Cannot Override the Constitution The Constitutional Limits of the Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue

For the sovereign of the Republic of Kosovo, any institutional structure that, outside the constitutional and legal order, creates a new level of power, autonomous competences, or institutional treatment of citizens on the basis of ethnic affiliation is unacceptable.

The Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue is a political and diplomatic process of importance for peace, stability, and the normalization of relations in the Western Balkans. It should be conducted seriously, in good faith, and with the aim of producing stable relations between the parties. But the dialogue, however important it may be, cannot create a legal order parallel to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.

This is the point from which any serious debate on the issue of the association of municipalities must begin.

The dialogue cannot be used as an instrument for creating a new level of power on an ethnic basis, outside the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Kosovo.

This position does not constitute a rejection of dialogue. Nor does it constitute opposition to the rights of communities. On the contrary, it is based precisely on the principles that should make a democratic and multi-ethnic state functional: the rule of law, equality before the law, protection of community rights, and the democratic accountability of institutions.¹

1. Sovereignty Derives from the People and Is Exercised in Accordance with the Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo defines Kosovo as an independent, sovereign, democratic, unitary, and indivisible state. It provides that sovereignty derives from the people and is exercised in accordance with the Constitution. It also establishes the Republic of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic society and provides that the exercise of public authority is based on the equality before the law of all individuals, respect for fundamental rights, and the participation of all communities.² These are not political declarations. They are constitutional norms.

For precisely this reason, every political agreement has a legal boundary: it cannot automatically produce an institutional structure of public power that is not recognized by the constitutional order.

The Constitution is the fundamental legal act of the Republic. It establishes institutions, the separation of powers, competences, and the manner in which public authority is exercised. The Constitutional Court is the final authority for interpreting the Constitution and for determining the compatibility of laws with it.³

Therefore:

A political agreement may create an obligation to engage in dialogue and implementation, but the manner in which it is implemented within the Republic of Kosovo must be compatible with the constitutional order.

2. Equality Before the Law and the Multi-Ethnic Character of Kosovo

The Constitution does not build the Republic of Kosovo upon the division of citizens into different categories of sovereignty. It defines Kosovo as a multi-ethnic society and requires public authority to be exercised on the basis of equality before the law of all individuals, while simultaneously guaranteeing the protection of the rights and participation of all communities.?

This creates a constitutional balance:

civic equality and protection of communities.

Both principles must exist together.

This means that community rights are not a political privilege that can be removed or granted according to the will of the majority. They are part of the constitutional order.

But it also means that the protection of communities should not automatically be interpreted as the creation of a new level of public power organized on an ethnic basis.

3. Community Rights Must Be Protected – Equally and Without Double Standards

Kosovo has chosen a constitutional model that recognizes specific rights for communities and their members. The Constitution guarantees the right to express, preserve, and develop cultural, religious, linguistic, and traditional identity; participation in public life; access to institutions; and various mechanisms for community representation.?

These guarantees should not be regarded as a problem.

On the contrary, they are one of the foundations of the democratic and multi-ethnic character of the Republic of Kosovo.

Therefore, the approach should be universal:

All communities have the right to effective protection of their identity, language, culture, education, participation in political life, and protection against discrimination.

There is no need to create different standards for different communities.

Such a system is also more sustainable from a European perspective, because European standards concerning minorities are linked to effective equality, non-discrimination, preservation of identity, and participation in public life.?

4. Kosovo Already Has a Constitutional System of Local Self-Government and Association of Municipalities

An element that is often left out of the debate is the fact that the Republic of Kosovo has established, through its Constitution and law, a system of local self-government. The Constitution guarantees local self-government and defines the municipality as its basic unit. It also requires respect for the European Charter of Local Self-Government.?

Law No. 03/L-040 on Local Self-Government further develops this system.

The Law grants municipalities the right to cooperate, establish partnerships and, in accordance with the law, form and participate in associations for the protection and promotion of their common interests. Article 31 expressly establishes this right, while Article 32 regulates associations of municipalities of the Republic of Kosovo.?

This is important for the public debate.

Because the question should not be whether municipalities in Kosovo have the right to cooperate.

They do have that right.

The question is whether, beyond this system, a new structure should be created which, depending on the manner in which its competences are defined, could become a separate level of public authority organized on the basis of ethnicity.

This is where the legal issue lies.

5. Association of Municipalities Is Not the Same as Creating a New Level of Power

The European Charter of Local Self-Government links local self-government to a constitutional and legal basis, competences defined by law, and the democratic accountability of local authorities. It also provides that administrative supervision of local authorities must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution or law and, in principle, should aim at ensuring compliance with legality and constitutional principles.? This brings us to a fundamental distinction:

Inter-municipal association and cooperation are not necessarily the same as the creation of a new level of public authority.

Municipalities may cooperate.

They may establish partnerships.

They may form associations.

They may coordinate services and common interests.

But if a new structure is given its own public competences, decision-making bodies with autonomous authority, separate financial resources, or functions that go beyond the competences of the participating municipalities, then the issue is no longer simply one of inter-municipal cooperation.

The constitutional question then arises:

Is a new level of public power being created?

And this question cannot be avoided through political terminology.

6. Judgment KO130/15 Cannot Be Ignored

At this point, there is a particularly important legal source: the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo in Case KO130/15. The Court examined the principles of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities and their relationship with the Constitution.

In its conclusions, the Court found that the presented principles were not fully consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, particularly with Article 3, Chapter II, and Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court determined that the legal act and statute that would elaborate these principles had to be in compliance with constitutional standards.¹?

Equally important is the fact that the Court did not treat the matter as an abstract prohibition of inter-municipal cooperation. Rather, it examined the limits within which such an association could operate.

The Court noted, among other things, that the financial rights provided for municipalities are linked to the municipalities themselves and that the financing and expenditures of an association must be in accordance with the Constitution and must not replace or infringe upon the rights of municipalities.¹¹

This is precisely the important point:

It is not sufficient for a structure to have been created through a political agreement; the legal act and statute establishing it must also comply with the Constitution. This is a standard established by the Constitutional Court itself.

7. The 2023 Agreement Must Be Read Together with the Constitution

The 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation contains provisions concerning the rights and organization of the Serb community in Kosovo and refers to the creation of "arrangements and guarantees" for an appropriate level of organization concerning the affairs of the Serb community and the provision of services in certain areas. The Agreement refers to relevant Council of Europe instruments and European experiences.¹² This is a fact that must be acknowledged directly.

But it must be equally directly acknowledged that:

The Agreement does not establish that any future structure may be created outside constitutional limits.

On the contrary, its own wording refers to European instruments and mechanisms that are to be further elaborated.

The Ohrid Implementation Annex also provides that all provisions are to be implemented and that implementation discussions are to take place within the EU-facilitated dialogue.¹³

Thus, there is a political obligation to implement and negotiate.

But the legal form of implementation must respect the constitutional order.

This is not contrary to the Agreement.

It is the only way to make implementation legally sustainable.

8. Obligations must be mutual

A normalization process cannot be sustainable if it is implemented selectively. The 2023 Agreement itself places the normalization process on the principle of normal and good-neighborly relations on the basis of equal rights and refers to the sovereign equality of states, respect for independence, territorial integrity, human rights, and non-discrimination.¹?

The Annex also provides that Kosovo and Serbia must implement the provisions and that failure to fulfil obligations may have consequences for their respective European integration processes.¹?

Therefore, the demand for implementation must be equal in standard and seriousness for both parties.

Kosovo cannot be asked only to implement.

Serbia must also be required to implement.

Dialogue must not become a mechanism of one-sided pressure.

Normalization requires reciprocity in obligations and responsibility.

9. European Standards Are Not Only About Minority Protection; They Also Require the Rule of Law

This is where Kosovo's position can be articulated constructively towards the European Union. The EU builds its order upon values such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.¹?

Therefore, we cannot isolate only one element of the European standard and forget the rest.

Minority protection and the rule of law must go together.

If the European standard requires the protection of communities, Kosovo must implement it.

But if the European standard also requires the rule of law and democratic institutions, then every institutional structure must have a legal basis and be subject to constitutional review.

This is precisely what makes our proposal acceptable in European language:

Full rights for communities, but within the rule of law.

10. The Role of Peter Sørensen and the Limits of Mediation

In this context, the role of the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue, Peter Sørensen, should also be clarified. The Council of the EU has extended his mandate until 29 February 2028. His mandate is connected with facilitating the dialogue and promoting EU policies and interests within this process.¹?

This mandate should be respected.

But its nature must also be respected.

The mediator is not a constitutional institution of the Republic of Kosovo.

He may facilitate negotiations, propose solutions, seek fulfilment of obligations, and mediate between the parties.

But he cannot replace the constitutional institutions of Kosovo, nor independently determine the content of the domestic legal order of the Republic.

In this context, one may also recall a classical principle of diplomatic law: Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that persons enjoying privileges and immunities have a duty to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State and not to interfere in its internal affairs.¹?

This reference must be made with legal precision: the Vienna Convention is not the direct source of Mr. Sørensen's mandate as EU Special Representative, which derives from the decision of the Council of the EU. But the principle of respect for the legal order of the receiving state forms part of an established tradition of diplomatic relations.

Therefore, the message to European representatives should be diplomatic and clear:

The EU is welcome as a mediator; but mediation cannot be transformed into a substitute for the constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo.

11. The Formula Kosovo Can Offer to Its International Partners

Kosovo does not need to respond with a simple "no." It can offer a "yes, but within the Constitution."

Yes to:

effective protection of the rights of all communities; their participation in public life; protection of cultural, linguistic, and religious identity; development of education and culture; anti-discrimination mechanisms; inter-municipal cooperation; partnerships between municipalities; association of municipalities in accordance with the law; cross-border cooperation in areas permitted by law; functional mechanisms that ensure public services and democratic participation.

But no to:

parallel power; unlimited autonomous competences; institutions that do not derive from the Constitution and law; executive competences outside the constitutional structure; structures that replace municipalities; institutional treatment of citizens solely on the basis of ethnic affiliation; a new level of power that is not integrated into the constitutional system of the Republic.

This is a pro-European platform, not an anti-European one.

Because it does not deny minority protection.

It demands that minority protection be implemented in the manner required by the rule of law itself.

Conclusion

The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic state. This is not its weakness.

It is part of its constitutional identity.

Therefore, the rights of communities must be strongly protected, without discrimination, and in accordance with European and international standards.

But the protection of communities does not necessarily require the creation of a new level of public power on an ethnic basis.

Community rights must not be placed in opposition to equality among citizens.

Both must be guaranteed simultaneously.

Kosovo has its Constitution, its system of local self-government, its law on municipalities, mechanisms for the protection of communities, and the right of municipalities to cooperate and associate.

If additional mechanisms are needed to realize community rights, they can be discussed.

But they must satisfy one fundamental condition: they must be in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

Because in a democratic state, a political agreement cannot stand above the Constitution.

Nor can an international mediator stand above the Constitution.

No community should stand above the law.

And no citizen should be placed below the law because of his or her ethnic affiliation.

Therefore, the formula is clear:

Dialogue — yes. The rights of all communities — yes. Protection of minorities in accordance with European and international standards — yes. Local self-government and inter-municipal cooperation — yes. Association of municipalities in accordance with the Constitution and the law — yes.

But the creation of a new level of power on an ethnic basis, outside the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Kosovo — no.

Because this is not a rejection of dialogue. It is the legal boundary that makes dialogue sustainable.

And this is the message that Kosovo can convey to its European partners through a legal, political, and diplomatic argument:

Dialogue Cannot Override the Constitution.

Footnotes: [1] Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter I, particularly Articles 1–4. The Constitution defines Kosovo as an independent, sovereign, democratic, unitary and indivisible state; establishes that sovereignty derives from the people and links the exercise of public authority to equality before the law, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the participation of communities.

[2] Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Articles 1, 2 and 3. Article 2 provides that sovereignty derives from the people and is exercised in accordance with the Constitution; Article 3 establishes the multi-ethnic character of society and the principle of equality before the law.

[3] Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Articles 4 and 112. Article 4 establishes the separation of powers and the role of the Constitutional Court as an independent body for the protection of constitutionality; Article 112 establishes the Constitutional Court as the final authority for the interpretation of the Constitution and the compatibility of laws with it.

[4] Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 3(1)–(2), and Article 24. Article 3 links the exercise of public authority to equality before the law of all individuals and to the protection of rights and participation of all communities.

[5] Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter III, Articles 57–62, concerning the rights of communities and their members, including identity, participation, and representation in public institutions. The Constitution also directly guarantees international human rights instruments through Article 22, including the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

[6] For European standards concerning minority protection, see the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, particularly the principles of effective equality, non-discrimination, preservation of identity, and participation in public life. In the case of Kosovo, the relevance of this instrument should also be read through Article 22 of the Constitution of Kosovo, which lists the Framework Convention among the instruments guaranteed and directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo.

[7] Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter X, Articles 123–124. The Constitution guarantees local self-government and establishes its organization and functioning; the system must respect the European Charter of Local Self-Government.

[8] Law No. 03/L-040 on Local Self-Government, Articles 28–32. Article 28 recognizes the right of municipalities to cooperate and establish partnerships; Article 29 regulates municipal partnerships; Article 30 regulates cross-border cooperation; Article 31 grants municipalities the right to establish and participate in associations for the protection and promotion of their common interests; Article 32 regulates associations of municipalities of the Republic of Kosovo.

[9] Council of Europe, European Charter of Local Self-Government, ETS No. 122, Strasbourg, 15 October 1985, particularly Articles 2–4 and 8–9. The Charter links local self-government to a constitutional and legal basis, competences defined by law, and the control of legality and constitutional principles.

[10] Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, Judgment in Case KO130/15, 23 December 2015, concerning the compatibility of the principles of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities with the Constitution. In its conclusions, the Court found that the principles were not fully consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and determined that the legal act and statute had to be drafted in accordance with constitutional standards.

[11] Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, KO130/15, paragraphs 179–183. The Court examined financing and expenditure issues in relation to Article 124(5) of the Constitution and emphasized that these rights belong to municipalities; the financing and expenditures of the Association/Community must not replace or infringe upon the rights of municipalities to receive and decide upon the expenditure of revenues and public financing.

[12] Agreement on the Path to Normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, 27 February 2023, Articles 1 and 2 and, in particular, Article 7. Article 1 establishes future relations on the basis of equal rights; Article 2 refers, inter alia, to sovereign equality, independence, territorial integrity, human rights, and non-discrimination; Article 7 provides for "specific arrangements and guarantees" for the Serb community and refers to relevant Council of Europe instruments and European experiences.

[13] Implementation Annex to the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia, Ohrid, 18 March 2023. The Annex provides for the Joint Monitoring Committee chaired by the EU, implementation of the provisions of the Agreement, implementation discussions within the EU-facilitated dialogue, and the responsibility of both parties to fulfil their obligations.

[14] Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, Articles 1 and 2. The Agreement links normalization with normal and good-neighborly relations on the basis of equal rights and with the principles of sovereign equality, independence, territorial integrity, human rights, and non-discrimination.

[15] Implementation Annex, particularly the paragraphs concerning implementation of all provisions, non-obstruction of implementation, and consequences for non-compliance with obligations. The Annex provides that failure to fulfil obligations may have consequences for the parties' European integration processes and financial assistance.

[16] Treaty on European Union, Article 2. The values of the European Union include human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

[17] Council of the European Union, EU Special Representatives: Council extends the mandates of the EUSRs for Human Rights and the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, 11 February 2026. The Council extended the mandate of Peter Sørensen as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue until 29 February 2028. The document explains that EU Special Representatives are appointed by the Council to promote EU policies and interests in specific areas and regions.

[18] Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Vienna, 18 April 1961, Article 41(1). The provision establishes that persons enjoying privileges and immunities have a duty to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State and not to interfere in its internal affairs. This reference is used here as a principle of diplomatic law; it should not be interpreted as a claim that Peter Sørensen's status as EU Special Representative is directly governed by the Vienna Convention.

Principal Legal Sources

Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo – Official Gazette Law No. 03/L-040 on Local Self-Government Constitutional Court – Judgment KO130/15 2023 Agreement – EEAS Ohrid Implementation Annex – EEAS European Charter of Local Self-Government – Council of Europe Peter Sørensen's Mandate – Council of the EU Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations – United Nations

The Land of Leka, 15.08.2026